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he 1999 Kosovo War between NATO members and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia confirmed the importance of issues relating to
the laws of war in contemporary conflicts, especially in coalition operations. It
also exposed some problems in that body of law. A central issue in the war was
the minimizing of civilian casualties. The NATO leadership recognized from
the start that this was of major importance, for two main reasons: because the
war was being fought with a stated purpose of protecting the inhabitants of
Kosovo and also because international opinion would not have tolerated a
war on civilians.1 An underlying question raised by the war is thus the extent
to which international legal considerations and institutions can assist in pro-
tecting the civilian.
The title of this paper calls for explanation. The terms “the laws of war” (jus
in bello) and “international humanitarian law” are for most purposes inter-
changeable. They refer to the same body of law. Both terms are used in this pa-
per. For most purposes I prefer the first of these terms, “laws of war” being
older and simpler, and recognizing as it does that war is the central area of
concern. However, the second term, “international humanitarian law,” some-
times with the suffix “applicable in armed conflicts,” is increasingly used in in-
ternational diplomacy. In some usages, this term can also encompass relevant
parts of the international law of human rights. The term may be particularly
appropriate in reference to a situation (such as applied in Kosovo before
March 24, 1999) in which there is no international armed conflict and only a
1. The importance of minimizing civilian casualties is stressed in the memoirs of the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe during the period of the Kosovo War. See WESLEY CLARK, WAGING
MODERN WAR 438–40 (2001).
small-scale civil war, but there is systematic government repression of part of
its own population. Whichever term one uses, the fact remains that the scope
of this body of law has significantly expanded in the past sixty years to encom-
pass the law on crimes against humanity and on genocide as well as the laws
and customs of international armed conflict; and that in the past decade this
body of law has been increasingly viewed as at least partially applicable in con-
flicts which are partly or completely non-international in character.
Eight questions
This survey concentrates on the following eight questions which (a) arose
in connection with the Kosovo War, and (b) also touch on matters which are
likely to affect the way in which the law is viewed, influences events, and de-
velops further in the future:
1. How did developments in the written laws of war which occurred in the
1990s, and the increasing international concern with implementation of the
law, affect the framework within which international responses to civil wars,
including in Kosovo, took place?
2. Is there now a stronger link than before between jus in bello and jus ad
bellum? In particular, what are the implications of the fact that sometimes, as
in Kosovo, violations of international humanitarian norms by a belligerent in
an internal conflict provide part of the rationale for external military
intervention?
3. If military action is embarked upon for proclaimed humanitarian pur-
poses by a large alliance or coalition, is there a logic whereby it is carried out by
low-risk, remote control methods? In particular, is the oxymoron, humanitar-
ian war, particularly likely to take the form of bombing; and what jus in bello
problems arise from reliance on air power?
4. Is there tension between (a) the NATO/US strategic doctrine which
aims at putting pressure on the adversary’s government, and not just its armed
forces, and (b) the implicit assumption of the laws of war that the adversary’s
armed forces are the main legitimate object of attack? If so, how can this ten-
sion be addressed?
5. What lessons are to be learned from the fact that the NATO operations
were subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)? In particular, does the consideration of the
NATO bombing campaign that was conducted under the auspices of the
ICTY Prosecutor suggest that the NATO campaign was conducted largely in
accord with member States’ obligations under the laws of war?
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6. Did the war confirm that there can be many forms of non-belligerence
which differ significantly from neutrality as traditionally conceived in the laws
of war?
7. Did the war expose deficiencies or omissions in the existing codifications
of the laws of war? In particular, is there a need for further codification? And
what are the main subject-areas that might require such codification?
8. What, if anything, might need to be done about the paradox that the
United States is simultaneously a principal upholder of the obligation of States
to observe the laws of war and a non-party to several important agreements on
the subject?
These questions are certainly not the only important jus in bello ones to
arise. A number of specific issues and controversies, such as the naval opera-
tions in the Adriatic and the bombing of the TV station in Belgrade, cannot
be covered here in the detail they deserve.
These eight questions have to be seen against a larger background of
changes in the conduct of international politics in the 1990s, and increasing
international preoccupation with the problem of civil wars and with the im-
plementation of the laws of war. These changes had a significant effect on the
fact, and the form, of NATO involvement in Kosovo.
Changes in the conduct of international politics
In the 1990s four factors, none of them entirely new, reinforced the ten-
dency of international bodies and foreign powers to get involved in wars, in-
cluding particularly civil wars, and also to apply pressure for implementation
of the laws of war by belligerents.
Firstly, most conflict since the end of the Cold War has had the character of
civil wars, though often with international involvements on one or more sides.
Since such wars cause appalling and often highly visible suffering, as well as
threatening international stability in the regions in which they occur, there has
been an evident need to ensure the application of certain rules of restraint in
such wars.
Secondly, many contemporary wars have a particular tendency to engage
the interests of outside powers because they threaten to create huge refugee
flows with which our not-very-liberal societies are unwilling to cope. Whether
it is northern Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo or East Timor, an unholy alliance of hu-
manitarianism and illiberalism makes intervention within the State undergo-
ing conflict a possible, even imperiously necessary, option.
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Thirdly, there has been a growing awareness that crimes committed by
States have been among the most serious of the twentieth century. The inter-
national preoccupation with restitution for a wide range of State misdeeds is
evidence of this.
Fourthly, it is widely accepted that the post-Cold War international order
has to be based on values other than, or additional to, mutual respect among
sovereign States. Human rights and humanitarian norms are core parts of any
such system of values. It is thus very difficult for States to ignore massive viola-
tions of fundamental norms.
The challenge of implementation
The main challenge facing the laws of war today is not devising new
rules—though some are needed. It is implementation of the rules that exist,
and of the underlying idea of moderation in the conduct of armed conflict. Un-
questionably, the preoccupation with implementation is widely shared among
those who have worked in the field of the laws of war; it has had a profound ef-
fect on policy and on treaty-making in this field; and it has been reflected in a
number of UN reports and in certain actions of the UN Security Council.
“Implementation” is taken to encompass (1) the normal measures taken by
States, and by international bodies including the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations, to ensure that populations
and armed forces are aware of the laws of war and carry out their terms; (2)
the actions taken by outside bodies, including States and international organi-
zations, in response to systematic violations of the laws of war. My focus is
mainly on this second and more difficult category, which encompasses the en-
forcement of the laws of war, but is not limited to coercive measures.
The concern with implementation should not be taken to imply support for
the commonly expressed view that existing implementation is lamentable or
even non-existent. In the 1999 Kosovo War there was much effective imple-
mentation. This was not only on the NATO side, but also in some instances
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) side. For example, in the talks at
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the conclusion of the war the FRY military provided extensive and accurate
information about the location of minefields.2 The central challenge is both to
improve patterns of implementation, and to further develop means of coping
with gross violations.
Changes in the Laws of War in the 1990s
In the decade before the war on Kosovo, there had been two striking devel-
opments in the laws of war: a tendency to make more explicit and detailed the
application of the laws of war to conflicts with a partly or wholly non-interna-
tional character; and a range of specific measures to improve mechanisms of
implementation. Both of these developments affected the United States and
NATO response to the events in Kosovo. Up to March 24, 1999 the Kosovo
problem had largely the character of State repression by the Yugoslav authori-
ties and civil war. It might thus have been perceived as a largely internal prob-
lem, about which the rest of the world should not worry. The fact that Kosovo
did not escape the attention of outside powers and bodies owes something to
the development of the law.
Changes in the written law
In the laws of war, as they developed from the mid-nineteenth century to
the Second World War, implementation was traditionally not treated as a ma-
jor topic in its own right. The general assumption, reflected in certain early
agreements on the laws of war (e.g., the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions)
was that civilized States could be relied on to ensure that their own armed
forces would act in a disciplined, restrained and professional manner. That
idea was called into question by the events of the twentieth century. When
the State that was supposed to take action was the very one whose armed
forces had committed the alleged offenses, the idea of purely national jurisdic-
tion seemed optimistic; and when the State itself was committed to a criminal
Adam Roberts
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2. Information from General Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, June
25–27, 1999. See also the UN Mine Action Programme website, www.mineaction.org. Its report
on Kosovo of September 2001 (available at the Mine Action website) showed that the Yugoslav
Army handed over 620 records of minefields in Kosovo, principally but not exclusively on the
Albanian and Macedonian borders. According to the final annual report on the UN Interim
Administration in Kosovo Mine Action Programme, covering the period to December 15, 2001,
the 620 records did not include mines laid by Ministry of Interior Police Units, or paramilitary
groups. UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report – 2001 (December 2001) ¶ 10 (available
at the Mine Action website).
policy, it was absurd. That is why since 1945 there has been a definite move-
ment towards a system of international criminal law affecting the activities of
States and armed forces.
As far as treaties are concerned, the old pattern of treating implementation
casually began to change significantly after the Second World War. The 1948
Genocide Convention authorized and indeed exhorted parties to take action
against offenders, including rulers and public officials; and it authorized action
through the UN. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions called for: (1) universal
jurisdiction as regards grave breaches, and (2) “Protecting Powers” to ensure
implementation of certain parts of the agreements in wartime. However, the
implementation systems specified in these treaties concluded in 1948 and
1949 have not been used much in the intervening years.
The 1977 Geneva Protocol I3 included some provisions attempting to break
the impasse. In particular, in accordance with the terms of its Article 90, the
“International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission” was set up in 1991.
Yet this too has not worked. Not a single one of the numerous problems in the
decade of its existence has been referred to it. In this, as in many other ways,
the actual forms of implementation that have been developed have been dif-
ferent from what was envisaged in treaties.
In short, the law developed before the 1990s had relatively few provisions
regarding implementation, and those that existed were not effective. This
does not mean that there was no implementation—many States did a capable
job of developing a culture of law observance within their own armed forces.
However, the war crimes and crimes against humanity of the 1990s exposed
the weakness of the implementation “system.”
Similarly, laws of war agreements concluded before the 1990s said relatively
little about civil war. The treaty provisions explicitly applicable in civil wars
were notoriously modest (being essentially Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and 1977 Geneva Protocol II), and were especially weak
on matters of implementation.
In the 1990s, States and international bodies made further attempts to ad-
dress questions of implementation and enforcement. Eight new legally binding
international documents in the area of the laws of war broadly defined were
adopted by the UN Security Council or by States at international conferences.
Only one of these new agreements (the 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser
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3. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAW OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Protocol I].
Weapons) does not deal extensively with implementation and enforcement,
or with the problem of civil war.4 The other seven new international instru-
ments, all of which do address these issues, are:
1. The 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. Adopted by the UN Security Council in 1993.
2. The 1994 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Adopted by the UN Security Council in 1994.
3. The 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel.
This is not part of the laws of war as such, but closely related. It
contains extensive provision for prosecution or extradition of
offenders.
4. The 1996 Amended Protocol II on Landmines to the 1980 UN
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. This requires each party
to take legislative and other measures against violations “by persons
or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.”
5. The 1997 Ottawa Landmines Convention. This contains extensive
provisions on transparency, compliance and dispute settlement.
6. The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered
into force July 1, 2002).
7. The 1999 Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property
in Armed Conflict (not yet in force). This was concluded and opened
for signature during the Kosovo War, but had been negotiated and
agreed well before. It contains numerous provisions regarding
implementation and enforcement not just of the Second Protocol
itself, but also of the Convention and the first Protocol (both of which
had been concluded in 1954).
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4. I exclude from this total documents of an essentially advisory character, such as the 1994
ICRC/UNGA Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the
Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, included in the UN Secretary-General’s report of 19
August 1994 to the UN General Assembly. See U.N. Doc. A/49/323 (1994).
All seven documents have two critically important features in common.
First, they contain some provisions that go beyond the old idea of essentially
national implementation by the authorities of individual States. Second, they
have formal application in wholly or partly non-international armed conflicts.
An unresolved problem: internationalized civil war
Most wars are much more confused in character than the simple dichoto-
mous definition of war, as being either international or non-international,
would suggest. Frequently, as in past eras, the civil wars of our time have had
international dimensions: troops and command structures from outside pow-
ers have often played major roles on one or more sides. In many cases a more
accurate short description of the conflict would be “internationalized civil
war”, although this is not a recognized category in the laws of war.
As far as the laws of war are concerned, one unhappy result of having largely
separate bodies of law applying to different aspects of the conflict is that courts,
especially ICTY, have had to devote enormous efforts to determining the char-
acter of the conflict in Bosnia as it arose in particular times, places and events.
The wars in Bosnia and Croatia were among many which have had partly in-
ternational and partly internal aspects. There must in principle be a case for
applying the whole of the body of the laws of war even to armed conflicts that
are substantially non-international in character, and some recent develop-
ments in the law do point in that direction. However, as far as Kosovo is con-
cerned, the question of the character of the conflict is not especially difficult.
Before March 24, 1999 it was mainly or entirely a non-international armed
conflict, occurring within the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
After that date there was, superimposed on that conflict, an international
armed conflict between the NATO powers and the FRY.
The UN Security Council’s involvement
In the 1990s the UN Security Council assumed a major role in attempting
to ensure implementation of the laws of war, including investigation and pun-
ishment of certain violations. This role was not entirely new. For example, al-
ready during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) the Security Council had
authorized the main official investigation into the use of chemical weapons.
In the conflicts of the 1990s the UN Security Council addressed issues re-
lating to the implementation of international humanitarian law in at least five
cases: Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–5); Somalia (1992); Rwanda (1994);
Sierra Leone (1997–2000); and Kosovo (1998–9). In addition to attacks on
civilians and other similar violations, a major issue at stake in some of these
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cases was the refusal of parties to permit delivery of humanitarian aid—which
is certainly a problem relating to the laws of war, but could also be considered
a violation of other norms and agreements.
In all these cases in the 1990s the Security Council went beyond appeals to
observe norms, and called for action. There were always several different
stated purposes for UN-authorized action or the threat thereof, but obser-
vance of humanitarian law was one of them. The actions taken by the Council
included not only the establishment of the international criminal tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but also action of a more direct kind. Some of the
cases of UN-authorized military action, and some cases of UN-imposed eco-
nomic sanctions, were partly based on claims that the target State had vio-
lated fundamental norms of humanitarian law.
These forms of action under UN Security Council auspices posed problems.
As regards military action, in most of these five crises a principal problem for
the UN was the difficulty of finding outside forces willing to act in situations
perceived to be dangerous. The failures of the UN, and of States, to act in time
in respect of the crises in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995 are clear ex-
amples. The enthusiasm for implementing humanitarian norms ran into the
rock of national interests. In respect of Kosovo the problem was different: the
main difficulty was in getting agreement in principle in the Security Council
that force should be used at all in response to the unfolding crisis. This was be-
cause, more than in any of the other five cases, any military action to stop on-
going atrocities in Kosovo involved violating the sovereignty of a functioning
sovereign State, Yugoslavia.
Links Between Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum
One consequence of the developments of the 1990s has been the strength-
ening of the idea that a systematic pattern of violations of the basic humani-
tarian norms of international humanitarian law may justify acts of military
intervention. Although there were many pre-echoes of this in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, the apparent strengthening of this link between jus
ad bellum and jus in bello represents a momentous and controversial change in
the terms of international debate.
The long-standing and important principle that the law relating to resort to
war (jus ad bellum) is a separate and distinct subject from the law relating to
conduct in war (jus in bello) remains valid and important. However, there have
always been causal links between these distinct bodies of law. One such link is
that aspect of the idea of proportionality that deals with the proportionality of
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a military response to the original grievance. The developing practice of mili-
tary action as a response to violations of the law of war is another important
link. Quite simply, massive violations of jus in bello by a belligerent can help to
legitimize certain threats and uses of force by outside powers intervening to
stop the violations.
In an effort to get an offending State to observe rules of restraint, the first
response of outside powers may be the threat, rather than the actuality, of
force. The use of pressure against States, for example in order to make them
accept an intervention force, as was attempted in Kosovo and done in East
Timor in 1999, raises a problem. Traditionally, international law and interna-
tional lawyers have been suspicious of agreements negotiated under duress. If
the host government has only given consent under extreme pressure, is its
consent valid? The experience of the post-1990 period shows how necessary
pressure can be to achieve international objectives, and how hard it is to elim-
inate certain aspects of power politics.
The change in the landscape, whereby humanitarian outrages serve in
practice as a basis for threatening or using force, has not been universally rec-
ognized. This is not surprising, particularly as the whole issue poses difficult di-
lemmas for humanitarian workers and organizations. In some cases in the
1990s, the violations of jus in bello that contributed to decisions to intervene
included assaults on aid workers and convoys. Any suggestion that humani-
tarian workers and organizations may play some part in triggering military ac-
tions challenges their deep (and in some cases legally based) commitment to
impartiality and neutrality. Almost all humanitarian workers and organiza-
tions are in a state of denial about the extent to which they, and the principles
and laws for which they stand, have played a part in initiating military action.
Where, following a pattern of violations, military action has been with the
authorization of the UN Security Council, and/or has had the consent (how-
ever reluctant) of the host State, there has not generally been a strong objec-
tion to it in principle. These conditions were present, for example, in Bosnia in
1995 and in East Timor in September 1999. However, where these conditions
were not present, as in Kosovo in March-June 1999, military intervention has
been strongly contested by major and minor powers.
In respect of Kosovo, before the NATO military action there had been sev-
eral UN resolutions which, in addition to many other elements, noted the vio-
lations of international humanitarian law there. For example, a long
resolution on Kosovo passed by the General Assembly in December 1998 crit-
icized the Yugoslav authorities for a variety of unacceptable practices, includ-
ing violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the
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1977 Protocol II; deplored the killing of humanitarian aid workers; and re-
quired the Yugoslav authorities to allow investigators from the International
Criminal Tribunal access to examine alleged atrocities against civilians.5 The
Security Council resolutions on Kosovo also addressed these issues. A resolu-
tion in March 1998 condemned “the use of excessive force by Serbian police
forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators.”6 In September 1998 the
Council expressed concern at “the excessive and indiscriminate use of force
by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army,” and at “reports of increas-
ing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law,” going
on to call for a cessation of such acts.7 This resolution, notably tough in tone,
followed a first-hand presentation made to the UN Security Council by a se-
nior representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) on September 11, 1998. The next resolution, passed in October
1998, also referred repeatedly to humanitarian issues.8 The failure of the Yu-
goslav authorities to comply with these resolutions was a key consideration in
the decisions of NATO countries to resort to the use of military force, as they
did on March 24, 1999. When President Clinton addressed the nation on that
day, in a key link in his argument he asked Americans: “Imagine what would
happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, as these
people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep.”9
To draw attention to the connection between issues related to violations of
the laws of war, and the decisions of outside countries to intervene, is not to
say that there is a simple and clear doctrinal or legal link. There is not now,
nor is there likely to be, a generally recognized “right” of humanitarian inter-
vention. Such interventions may occasionally be necessary, but to suggest
that they are a general “right” implies that it is possible to adjudicate in a gen-
eral way between the undoubted and still important non-intervention rule on
the one hand, and the demands of humanitarian considerations on the other.
Any decision on forcible intervention must involve a balancing of consider-
ations in the face of unique and urgent circumstances, not the assertion of a
general right.
To suggest that there is no general right of humanitarian intervention is not
to say that certain uses of force for humanitarian ends are necessarily illegal
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5. G.A. Res. 53/164 (Dec. 8, 1998), U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/164 (1998).
6. S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).
7. S.C. Res. 1199 (Sep. 23, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).
8. S.C. Res. 1203 (Oct. 24, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
9. THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYTICAL
DOCUMENTATION 1974–1999, at 416 (Heike Krieger ed., 2001).
under international law; nor is it to assert that certain uses of force are simply
beyond the scope of international law. Rather, it is to suggest that in respect
of each intervention there are important, relevant but alas competing legal
principles which have to be balanced against each other; and a great deal de-
pends on the particular facts and legal considerations that relate to that par-
ticular case.
Since the Kosovo War there have been attempts to develop a “right” of
humanitarian intervention by such figures as UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
in his speech in Chicago on April 22, 1999; UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan in his UN report of September 8, 1999; a number of speakers in the
UN General Assembly in 1999; the then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy in a lecture in New York on February 10, 2000; and the then UK
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in a speech in London on July 19, 2000. Yet
there is absolutely no sign of international agreement on their propositions.
Moreover, the US government has never wanted a doctrine in this area that
might tie its hands.
The attempt to develop a general doctrine could actually do harm to the
cause of humanitarian intervention: such an attempt can imply that the legiti-
macy of each case of intervention is dependent on the existence of a general
right. Since that right does not exist, the legitimacy of individual actions may,
if anything, be reduced. Because pursuit of a defined legal right is doomed to
fail, and the conditions giving rise to humanitarian intervention will not dis-
appear, the situation is likely to remain untidy. It probably ought to do so.
The recognition of a link between jus in bello and jus ad bellum falls far short
of any general recognition of a right of humanitarian intervention.10 What has
emerged from the experiences of the 1990s is a pattern of acquiescence by sig-
nificant numbers of States in respect of some interventions with stated hu-
manitarian purposes. However, there has also been strong opposition by
States to particular interventions, and even stronger opposition to the grant-
ing of a general right. The distinctly uneven pattern of acquiescence is not the
same thing as the recognition of a right.
The fact that an intervention may be motivated by humanitarian consider-
ations, including a concern to stop violations of human rights and humanitar-
ian norms, does not in any way affect the equal application of the laws of war
in any resulting hostilities. During the Kosovo war there was no suggestion
from any party that the United States and its allies were entitled to ignore any
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10. See Adam Roberts, The So-Called “Right” Of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3–51 (2002).
aspects of jus in bello because they were engaged in what they saw as a high
moral cause.11 If anything, the logic was rather that the humanitarian ele-
ments in the stated reasons for resort to war particularly obliged the NATO
members to observe the rules of war.
The Kosovo War confirmed another connection between jus in bello and jus
ad bellum. In the Kosovo War, as in a number of other recent conflicts, the
public’s perception of the legitimacy of the operation as a whole appeared to
depend in significant measure on a public understanding that the war was be-
ing fought in a disciplined and restrained manner, and in accordance with in-
ternational norms. Some of the worst moments for NATO in the entire
campaign were when NATO appeared to be falling short of this standard.
Support for the war could easily have evaporated if there had been more inci-
dents such as the bombing of refugee convoys.
Bombing as a Default Form of Humanitarian War
Bombing from the air formed a key part of the Western response to at least
three humanitarian crises of the 1990s: (1) in northern and southern Iraq
since 1991, as a means of maintaining “no-fly-zones,” enabling refugees to re-
turn home, and limiting the activities of the Iraqi armed forces; (2) in Bosnia
in 1995, especially in the form of NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force, fol-
lowing the Bosnian Serbs’ brutal massacre at Srebrenica and their renewed as-
sault on Sarajevo; and (3) in 1999, in the war over Kosovo.
One underlying reason for reliance on air power in such cases is the reluc-
tance of the populations and governments of Western democracies to take
substantial risks, for example by using ground forces in a combat role, in what
were perceived to be distant humanitarian causes. This reluctance is under-
standable but may at times jeopardize the effectiveness of operations. In the
1999 war it was disadvantageous to NATO, and to the inhabitants of Kosovo,
that Milosevic was not confronted with a more convincing threat of land op-
erations in the province.
Bombing as such has never been, and is not now, violative of the laws of
war, but in practice it has frequently risked violating norms requiring force to
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11. This was confirmed in the discussion of the committee established by the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to review NATO actions in
Yugoslavia. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶¶ 30–4, 39
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1265–6 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A
[hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
be directed at military targets and to be used discriminately. The increased ac-
curacy of certain air-delivered weapons in several recent conflicts, including
the 1991 Gulf War, has indicated that certain uses of air power may be, or
have the capacity to become, compatible with the existing rules about target-
ing and discrimination. This was one conclusion of the detailed UK House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Kosovo. It noted that this was
the first armed conflict in which the United Kingdom had engaged since it rat-
ified Protocol I in 1998; and after considering the main areas of controversy
surrounding the bombing it concluded: “On the evidence available to us, we
believe that NATO showed considerable care to comply with the 1977 Proto-
col and avoid civilian casualties.”12
However, the use of air power in this war posed certain problems. Some of
these were more political than legal: the controlled use of air power is an op-
tion available to very few States, and it naturally causes both fear and resent-
ment. Some of the problems were technical, but have a major impact on
evaluations of the lawfulness of particular uses of air power. As the Kosovo war
demonstrated, even in the electronic age air power suffers from certain striking
limitations, and it has a natural tendency to lead to unintended damage.
The 1999 Kosovo War began in an atmosphere of arrogant and ignorant il-
lusions among Western decision-makers about the capacity of bombing to
protect the inhabitants of Kosovo and/or to bring about a change in Serbian
policy in a matter of days. In the end, the bombing could only succeed as a
campaign of long-drawn-out coercive pressure, in which other elements were
also involved.
The Kosovo War exposed certain limitations in the capacity of bombing to
achieve results. Most notably, bombing was not at all effective in providing
protection or relief from Serb attacks, for the hard-pressed Kosovars. The ini-
tiation of the bombing campaign was followed by an intensification of those
attacks, leading to huge numbers of people fleeing from their homes. In his ad-
dress on March 24 President Clinton did warn that Yugoslavia “could decide
to intensify its assault on Kosovo.”13 However, the apparent belief of many
Western policy-makers that NATO military action would deter Milosevic
from further atrocities against the Kosovars was one of the most shocking
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Proceedings of the Committee, HC 28-I, May 2000, ¶¶ 145, 157.
13. President Clinton, Address to the Nation, March 24, 1999. Text in THE KOSOVO
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 415–6 (Heike Krieger, ed.) (Cambridge International
Documents Series, Volume 11).
lapses of the crisis.14 One reason why the bombing failed to stop the ethnic
cleansing is that it had very limited effects on movable military targets. A sup-
pressed USAF investigation is reported to have showed that NATO forces
verifiably destroyed just fourteen Serb tanks in Kosovo, eighteen armored per-
sonnel carriers, and twenty artillery pieces. As Tim Garton Ash has com-
mented: “Even if the real figures are higher than that, it is an indisputable fact
that ethnic cleansing increased under the bombing.”15 It is probably true that
bombing did inhibit the mobility of Serb armor, but that is a modest achieve-
ment especially in a context in which heavy armor was not necessary for the
effective pursuit of ethnic cleansing.
Partly because of its stated humanitarian purpose, the Kosovo air campaign
involved many elements of restraint, including in target selection, in efforts to
ensure the accuracy of bombing, and in the evident willingness to abandon
sorties because of concerns about potential civilian casualties. Yet the case
confirms that such bombing can cause direct damage to civilians and to
non-military installations and activities in several distinct ways.
• Unintended damage caused by bombing from high altitude. It has been
frequently asserted that the problems of damage to civilians and civilian
property were made worse by NATO aircraft generally flying at a safe
altitude. The potentially disastrous consequences of flying at altitude are
obvious: in attacks on railway bridges, the time an air-to-ground guided
weapon takes to get to the target may also be the time a passenger train
takes to get onto the bridge; and in attacks on road convoys, it may be
impossible at 15,000 feet to be sure that the convoy does not contain, or
even consist largely of, the very civilians who are supposedly being
protected. Both of these things happened in the Kosovo War, and many
died as a result. Yet there may also be certain advantages in attack
aircraft operating from relative safety: not just that the aircrew are safer,
but also that they have more time in which to acquire targets and make
decisions, can afford to make a second pass over a target if they are in
doubt, and may feel less urgency about getting rid of whatever explosives
they are carrying so that they can rush back to safety.
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• Pressure to attack fixed targets. A major problem in Kosovo was that,
because it proved relatively easy to conceal military units and movable
equipment from attacks from the air, and to fabricate dummies, there was
especially strong pressure on the NATO alliance to attack large fixed
targets. In many cases (bridges, power stations, buildings of various types,
the broadcasting station in Belgrade) these were dual-use targets which
had major civilian as well as military functions.
• Changing functions of buildings. Even if targets are believed to be purely
military and are hit accurately, as with the Amariya bunker in Baghdad in
1991 or the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, their function proved
in the event to be different from what the targeteers had believed.
• Long-term effects of certain weapons on the civilian population. Trying to
inhibit the adversary’s military movements by the use of cluster bombs
and similar weapons can have a long-term adverse effect on the civilian
population and on international military personnel who may be present
in the territory following the end of hostilities. (The question of cluster
bombs is considered further below.)
In some cases the damage to civilians or civilian objects may be completely
unintended. However, in other cases (especially against certain dual-use tar-
gets) the damage may be seen by military planners as contributing to the over-
all goal of wearing down the adversary’s will to carry on with the struggle.
Behind these problems lay a deeper and more intractable one. If the prime
function of a bombing campaign is to bring about a capitulation by the govern-
ment of the country, what happens when the bombing starts to run out of mili-
tary targets, and seems unable to force a change of policy on the part of the
target government? In such circumstances, there is bound to be heavy pres-
sure to continue with the bombing and to direct it at targets which are doubt-
ful or plainly illegal under the laws of war.
A particular challenge posed by the development of precision-guided muni-
tions is that it is harder than in earlier eras to deny that there was a specific in-
tention to hit whatever object was hit. As a result, armed forces and
individuals may be more likely than before to be held responsible for specific
acts of destruction. This development could have a considerable effect on how
destruction is viewed by the public in allied, neutral or adversary States. It
could also, at least potentially, create additional grounds for conducting inqui-
ries, investigations and prosecutions, whether by the internal disciplinary
mechanisms of States and armed forces, or by international criminal tribunals.
The exact combination of factors that led Milosevic to back down on June
3, 1999 is not yet known with any certainty. There are three obvious factors:
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the bombing; the prospect of invasion of Kosovo by NATO land forces; and
the isolation of Yugoslavia, especially with the abandonment of Milosevic by
his last significant potential ally, Russia. General Clark considers that it was
the combination of these three factors that led to the Milosevic surrender.16
The indictment of Milosevic by ICTY announced on May 27, 1999, discussed
further below, may also have contributed to the ending of the war. How these
and other factors are evaluated will heavily influence any overall verdict on
the lessons to be drawn from the Kosovo War, and on the importance, or the
limitations, of the laws of war. As to the effect of bombing, my own provisional
evaluation is that even though certain initial assumptions about how quickly a
bombing campaign might achieve results were mistaken, that does not prove
that the actual bombing, and the threat of more, were not important. They
were. The most difficult question this raises so far as the laws of war are con-
cerned is the following: did attacks on dual-use targets, and/or a perceived
threat of further attacks directed at civilians and civilian objects, play a major
part in the Yugoslav decision of June 3?17
In conclusion, a lesson of the bombing in the Kosovo War is that, while air
power undoubtedly achieved significant results, its use involved serious prob-
lems. It did not perform particularly well against what might have been con-
sidered a relatively straightforward target, namely an army which was reliant
on heavy armor and operated on at least partly conventional lines.18 It was
slow to achieve results even against a State debilitated by years of war and
poor economic performance. It would be hazardous to assume that a similar
air campaign would necessarily be the appropriate course in the context of an-
other urgent humanitarian or other crisis. It appears that a systematic cam-
paign of bombing was not a serious option when the East Timor crisis was at its
gravest in September 1999.
NATO Strategic Doctrine
NATO’s conduct in the 1999 Kosovo War confirms that there is continu-
ing tension between certain contemporary strategic doctrines and the implicit
vision of war contained in the laws of war. Over recent decades the United
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States and NATO have developed a conception of how force can be applied
which involves putting military pressure not just on the armed forces of the
adversary State, but on its government. Such an approach was evident in
some official thinking about nuclear deterrence and strategic doctrine gener-
ally vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It has also been evident in the conduct of cer-
tain operations in which NATO members have been involved, including
aspects of the bombing campaign against Iraq in early 1991 as well as the
Kosovo War eight years later.
The NATO approach is in tension with one underlying principle of the
laws of war, as famously expressed in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,
“that the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.” Actually the laws of
war as they have developed in the intervening years are not so restrictive as
the words of the St. Petersburg Declaration might imply. In particular, they by
no means exclude the application of military force against aspects of the ad-
versary’s war-making capacity and system of government. In the Kosovo cam-
paign, the targets of operations clearly had to encompass all those taking an
active part in ethnic cleansing, even if they were only police.
There is much to be said in favor of attacks against government targets.
Such attacks may reach the individuals most directly responsible for the situa-
tion which has led to war. They may save lives among the adversary’s armed
forces, many of who will be essentially innocent individuals conscripted into
the front line. They may shorten the duration of hostilities. However, there
are also problems with attacks aimed at government targets. The very govern-
ment whose actions caused a war may also be the only body that can end it, in
which case its continued existence is vital. Attacks against government tar-
gets may have severe effects on the civilian population, and may indeed in-
volve attacks on people or objects that are non-military in character. There is
much scope for debate as to whether, for example, the homes and families of
government ministers are legitimate military targets.
The key question of what is a military objective, addressed most extensively
in certain provisions of Protocol I, may merit re-examination. Numerous
States, including many NATO members, had already long before the Kosovo
War made declarations or reservations regarding some of these provisions.
NATO members, including non-parties to Protocol I such as the United
States, may now need to address the question of how their conceptions of war
relate to the limits on targeting that are specified in the laws of war. It may be
doubted whether such an exercise would lead to specific revisions to the writ-
ten laws of war, or to the reservations to Protocol I made by NATO States, but
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it might suggest some criteria for handling the tensions between NATO doc-
trine and the laws of war.
International Tribunals: ICTY
The conduct of hostilities by NATO in the Kosovo War became the sub-
ject of consideration by no less than three international courts and tribunals:
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). Although the ICJ case, brought by Yugoslavia, revolved mainly
around matters of jus ad bellum, it did also involve claims concerning breaches
of international humanitarian law. This ICJ case is ongoing, and demon-
strates, sadly, that legal processes sometimes proceed at a pace far slower than
war. The ECHR case was brought against all seventeen European NATO
states by six Yugoslav citizens complaining about the bombing of the TV sta-
tion in Belgrade by NATO forces on April 23, 1999, in which sixteen people
were killed and another sixteen seriously injured. In its decision of December
12, 2001 the ECHR ruled that there was no jurisdictional link between the
persons who were victims of the bombing and the seventeen NATO states,
and therefore the application was inadmissible.
In contrast to the limited part played by ICJ and ECHR, ICTY had a num-
ber of important roles in connection with the Kosovo War. It played a signifi-
cant part during the build-up of the crisis, principally through its entirely
proper and widely supported insistence on recording details of atrocities in
Kosovo. In March 1998 the Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, affirmed that ICTY’s
jurisdiction “is ongoing and covers the recent violence in Kosovo.”19 A defin-
ing moment occurred on January 18, 1999, when the Prosecutor applied for
entry to Kosovo in order to “investigate the reported atrocities at Racak,” but
was refused. This hardened views in NATO member States that no political
settlement would work unless it allowed for the deployment of a substantial
NATO-led force. Even during the hostilities, ICTY investigators were active
outside Kosovo in collecting evidence of crimes by the Yugoslav forces in the
province.20
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The announcement on May 24, 1999 of the indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and four col-
leagues further illustrated the way in which ICTY’s role was unavoidably
caught up in political and military events.21 Milosevic was indicted in respect
of the conduct of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo during the war there in 1998-9. In
this particular case, despite speculation to the contrary, the indictment may
have contributed to the willingness of Milosevic to make the concessions nec-
essary for a settlement, as he did early in June 1999. The ICTY indictment, as
General Clark has argued, may have hardened European resolve to continue
with the struggle.22 It is also possible that it compelled Milosevic to focus on
reaching a settlement while he still had a functioning State around him which
could protect him from arrest and trial; and it may also have shocked him into
an erroneous belief that he could escape from the threat of trial by cutting a
deal with NATO.23 If he did entertain any such hope, he was to be disap-
pointed. On June 28, 2001 Milosevic, by this time the former President, was
extradited to The Hague to face trial, which began on February 12, 2002. This
first-ever extradition of a former head of State to face trial before an interna-
tional criminal tribunal is an important precedent.
The ICTY’s most unusual role, its consideration of NATO actions, was
particularly controversial in the United States. In 1999 the United States,
having been campaigning diplomatically against the projected International
Criminal Court for the previous six months on the grounds that the actions of
US forces should not be subject to a foreign prosecutor and tribunal, chose to
wage war in the one part of the world where ongoing war was subject to such a
tribunal. The ICTY, the establishment of which the United States had ac-
tively promoted in 1993, has much stronger powers of independent investiga-
tion and prosecution than are provided for the projected International
Criminal Court under the terms of the 1998 Rome Statute.24
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On May 14, 1999, while hostilities in the Kosovo War were ongoing, the
ICTY Prosecutor established a committee to assess the numerous allegations
made against the NATO bombing campaign and the material accompanying
them. It prepared an interim report which was presented to the Prosecutor on
December 6, 1999. On February 1, 2000 the Prosecutor stated that there was
no evidence that NATO’s bombing campaign had violated international trea-
ties on the conduct of war. The committee investigating the NATO campaign
then prepared a detailed final report, published in June 2000, discussing the
numerous facts and issues involved. It provided evidence for the conclusion
that as a result of the NATO bombing approximately 495 civilians were killed
and 820 wounded in documented instances. It recommended that “neither an
in-depth investigation related to the bombing campaign as a whole nor inves-
tigations related to specific incidents are justified. In all cases, either the law is
not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition
of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or
against lower accused for particularly heinous offences.” The Report’s final
recommendation was that “no investigation be commenced by the OTP [Of-
fice of the Prosecutor] in relation to the NATO bombing campaign or inci-
dents occurring during the campaign.”25 On June 2, 2000 the ICTY
Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, stated in her address to the UN Security Council
that she would not open a criminal investigation into any aspect of NATO’s
bombing campaign, and this was confirmed eleven days later in a statement is-
sued by the Office of the Prosecutor.26
The Report to the Prosecutor had many limitations, and the reactions to it
showed how difficult it is to get justice done, and seen to be done, when con-
troversial issues of war, peace and national pride are at stake. ICTY’s consider-
ation of the bombing campaign ran into two depressingly predictable lines of
political criticism. First, some initial US reactions suggested a sense of outrage
that any prosecutor anywhere would even contemplate the possibility of in-
vestigating a US-led military action. Because of this outrage, there was little
sign that ICTY’s decision not to launch any criminal investigation caused any
easing of US concerns about the proposed International Criminal Court. Sec-
ondly, some reactions by countries and individuals critical of the NATO cam-
paign suggested that the ICTY was hardly impartial, not least because NATO
member States had played a significant part in creating it, financing it, and
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arresting indicted individuals. In this view, ICTY could not realistically have
embarked on prosecutions of NATO personnel.
In addition to such political criticisms, the Report to the Prosecutor was
vulnerable on other grounds. It was criticized by some international lawyers as
being insufficiently rigorous in its consideration of NATO actions and deci-
sion-making, especially as regards the balancing of military advantage and
civilian damage.27 Even to those, like myself, who do not quarrel with its
overall recommendation, some parts of its analysis call for comment. On the
question of damage to the environment it makes the common mistake of as-
suming that the only relevant provisions in treaty law are those provisions of
Protocol I, namely Articles 35(3) and 55, which specifically mention the
word “environment.”28 On the question of what is a military objective, it
states (probably correctly) that Protocol I, Article 52, is “generally accepted as
part of customary law,” but nowhere mentions the declarations made in re-
spect of that article by many States, including NATO members.29 On the
question of the scale and gravity of offence that brings an action within
ICTY’s remit, the Report says remarkably little. Indeed, the Report implies, in
the concluding passage quoted above, that the reasons for not pursuing any
investigation were a lack of clarity of the law, or a lack of sufficient evidence.
The fundamental reason why ICTY could not act in this matter, not fully ex-
pressed in the conclusions, was that the alleged NATO offenses, because of
considerations of scale, gravity and absence of criminal intent, did not pass
the threshold that would have brought them into the court’s remit. Despite
such flaws, the committee performed a service by openly addressing a number
of difficult issues raised by the NATO bombing campaign, and demonstrating
that, although NATO decisions and actions were within ICTY’s jurisdiction,
there were serious grounds for doubt as to whether any of them was such as to
merit further investigation and possible prosecution.
Ultimately ICTY’s most important role in relation to Kosovo, as well as to
other parts of the former Yugoslavia, may be by holding particular individuals
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guilty of some of the terrible crimes associated with ethnic cleansing. Only by
establishing individual guilt in this way can the idea of collective guilt be effec-
tively challenged.30
Variety of Forms of Non-belligerence and Neutrality
The campaign confirmed the lesson of numerous wars of the twentieth cen-
tury that non-participation in war can assume many forms much more subtle
and complex than the impartial neutrality spelled out in certain laws of war
agreements. Two developments of the Kosovo crisis and war stand out—one
typical, the other exceptional. First, in this war various non-belligerent States
took part in the ongoing UN economic sanctions against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and some offered some other elements of support for the
NATO operations. These events thus confirmed the lesson of many other
conflicts in the twentieth century, that the traditional law of neutrality, with
its emphasis on impartiality, is far from covering all circumstances and cases.
Secondly, one part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, namely
Montenegro, pursued a policy close to neutrality during the NATO bombing
campaign. From the outset of hostilities NATO policy-makers recognized this
remarkable, perhaps even unprecedented, state of affairs, and acted accord-
ingly.31 This is further evidence that the law’s neat classification of States into
belligerents and neutrals can be confounded by messy realities; and that the
reasons for moderation in war extend far beyond jus in bello.
These developments show that life (in the form of conduct during war) is
richer than art (in the form of legal agreements). However, they do not show
that there is an urgent need to modify art to reflect the complexities of life.
Neither of these developments threw up serious practical problems—certainly
not those of the kind that could attract a general legal answer. In particular, it
would be a brave person who dared to assert, as a matter of general right, that
the component parts of a federal State should be free to declare their neutral-
ity, especially in a war in which the parent State is under direct assault from
outside. What these developments do show is that law can only provide a
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partial framework for the conduct of States and individuals during war:
unique situations which defy tidy legal categorization frequently occur.
New Codifications
Certain issues raised in recent wars, including the Kosovo War, have been
perceived by some as pointing to lacunae in the existing law. Three major con-
troversies arising from the Kosovo War, and which might point to the need for
new codification, concerned the environmental effects of war generally, and
two related issues, depleted uranium and cluster bombs.32
Environmental effects of war
This is a complex area, on which existing treaty law offers general principles
as well as a number of relevant rules. The best available short summary of the
legal framework on this subject is the 1994 ICRC/UN General Assembly doc-
ument “Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of
the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict.”33 In studies of the subject
there has been a broad consensus against the idea of trying to negotiate a new
treaty on the protection of the environment in war.34
Many NATO actions in the Kosovo War led to expressions of concern on
environmental grounds. The actions that were most questioned included the
destruction of bridges causing blockage of major rivers; attacks on power sta-
tions having serious knock-on effects on water supplies, etc.; other attacks on
the infrastructure of Serbia; and the use of depleted uranium and cluster
bombs, discussed separately below.
There were prompt and careful investigations of certain key issues. A study
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Environment
Programme in 1999 concluded a key part of its study: “There is no evidence of
an ecological catastrophe for the Danube as a result of the air strikes during
the Kosovo conflict.” It went on to say, however, that there were “some
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serious hot spots where contamination by hazardous substances released dur-
ing the air strikes poses risks for human health and the aquatic environment.”
It also stressed that there was long-term chronic pollution of the Danube due
to factors other than the war.35 The report was overwhelmingly concerned
with describing the situation and proposing remedial action: it did not discuss
existing or possible future international legal regimes governing environmen-
tal destruction in war. The Chairman of the Task Force that prepared the re-
port stated that the exercise “marked the first time that an environmental
impact assessment had been made of any war, though the UN did look at the
effects of oil well fires after the Gulf War with Iraq.”36
For the future, while no grand general treaty on the environmental effects
of war is remotely probable, it seems likely that the practice of evaluating ac-
tual cases, coupled with demands for remedial action, will continue.
Depleted uranium
The military value of depleted uranium (DU) shells in piercing heavy ar-
mor is proven. At the same time the very mention of the word “uranium”
arouses considerable public anxiety. The use of DU in the Kosovo War, and
the various issues that it raised, was not well handled by NATO spokespersons
either during or after the war.37
The greatest controversy in NATO member States concerned fears that
exposure to DU might have been a cause of subsequent cases of cancer among
their own troops. In this connection there were criticisms of official policy to-
wards NATO/KFOR troops involved in operations in Kosovo after the end of
the bombing campaign. This is not strictly speaking a laws of war issue, as it in-
volves relations between governments and their own troops. Some member
States, including the UK, were inconsistent in the briefings given to their own
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troops serving in Kosovo about possible hazards, and also about subsequent
health screening.38
As far as jus in bello is concerned, the main issues raised are the possible ef-
fects of DU on adversary troops and third parties, both during and after an
armed conflict. In particular, the use of DU involves a matter with which the
laws of war have long dealt: the adverse effect that remnants of war may have,
including on innocent civilians, long after hostilities are over. The scientific
evidence about possible health effects of DU is still inconclusive, and the
ICRC has been notably cautious in its statements on the matter. In view of
DU’s exceptionally slow rate of radioactive decay it is far from certain whether
any worry should focus on its radioactivity. Grounds for concern which seem
more likely to have a strong scientific basis are (a) evidence of impurities in-
cluding much more highly radioactive isotopes of uranium; and (b) the possi-
ble toxicity of DU, though this is far from established. Such concerns will be
increased by reports of pollution of groundwater in Kosovo. Careful scientific
investigation of the effects of DU must be the first priority. Since there is at
present no international consensus on its effects or on the desirability of put-
ting legal controls on it, DU will not be a promising subject for negotiation un-
til there has been a fuller scientific investigation.
Cluster bombs
The explosive remnants of war, a problem of long standing which has tradi-
tionally been a subject of concern in the laws of war, proved to be a serious
problem in the aftermath of the Kosovo War. Cluster bombs formed one part
of that problem. These weapons, which are meant to explode on impact
and/or to deactivate themselves after a specific period, can cause particularly
severe problems when they fail to do so. In the year after the NATO bombing
campaign ended in June 1999, at least 50 people in Kosovo were killed and
101 injured by unexploded bomblets. Over 15,000 unexploded bomblets were
left in Kosovo, and NATO was criticized for failing to provide sufficient infor-
mation on where cluster bombs were dropped. Cluster bombs killed or
maimed five times more Kosovar children than landmines. Peter Herby, head
of the Red Cross anti-mines unit, said: “Anti-personnel landmines were doing
what they were meant to do, but were not being used properly. Cluster bombs
are causing this problem because they’re not doing what they were designed to
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do, so it’s a bit more difficult to argue on humanitarian grounds.”39 Despite
this difficulty, the use of cluster bombs could usefully be addressed within a
laws of war framework: the harm they can do to innocents is hardly in dispute,
and although complete prohibition is unlikely, means to reduce the threat
they pose to civilians and others should be investigated.
The United States and Certain Laws of War Agreements
US non-participation in key treaties
Despite its conspicuous role in certain acts of enforcement of the laws of
war, the United States is not a party to several important treaties on the laws
of war. Its notorious difficulties in accepting international treaties produced
the strange result that it took the United States forty years to ratify the 1948
Genocide Convention. The United States is still not formally a party to the
following agreements.
• The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention. Parties: 103. (The United
States signed in 1954, but it has not been ratified.)
• The 1977 Geneva Protocols I & II on International and Non-international
Armed Conflicts. Parties: 159 and 152 respectively. (The United States
signed both on December 12, 1977, but has not ratified either one.)
• The 1980 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons. Parties: 81.
• The 1995 Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons. Parties: 63.
• The 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Land-mines. Parties: 124.
• The 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court. Parties: 75. (The
United States signed on December 31, 2000, but has not ratified it. In
May 2002 the United States informed the Depositary that it did not
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at 14, commenting on a Red Cross report first issued in September 2000. A revised version of this
report is INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CLUSTER BOMBS AND
LANDMINES IN KOSOVO: EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (2001). I have also relied here on
the annual reports of the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) in Pristina, available at
www.mineaction.org. The final annual report on the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo
Mine Action Programme, covering the period to December 15, 2001, stated that it “has
successfully completed its objectives, and the problems associated with land mines, cluster
munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo have virtually been eliminated.”
(¶ 4.) Over 47,000 devices were cleared. (¶ 9.) Nonetheless, there continued to be concerns
about a remaining threat from unexploded cluster bomblets in Kosovo, with further finds being
reported, e.g., by Richard Lloyd, Director of Landmine Action, London.
intend to become a party to the treaty and accordingly has no legal
obligations arising from its signature.)40
It would be wrong to view the US’s or any other State’s non-participation in
a treaty as in itself a failure. There are some questionable provisions in some
treaties in this area. Although a non-party, the United States takes at least
some of these accords more seriously than some States that are parties. The
reasons for US non-participation go far beyond the obduracy of one single el-
derly Senator, and call for careful analysis rather than uncomprehending con-
demnation. In some cases they are based on serious arguments.
Indeed, there may be a price for like-minded States taking the lead in nego-
tiation of particular treaties, as happened in the case of the Ottawa
land-mines convention. The price is that States which are partially or wholly
outside the consensus, and have particular problems which need to be ad-
dressed, feel sidelined. This also happened at the Rome conference in 1998.
Add a prohibition on reservations—as was done with the Ottawa and Rome
treaties—and there is a recipe for non-participation even by States, such as
the United States, which have a serious record of supporting the general
thrust of these projects.
Of the above agreements, the one most directly relevant to the NATO op-
erations in the Kosovo War was the Protocol I. At the time of the Kosovo
War, all NATO States were parties except the United States, Turkey and
France.41 Although the Protocol was in force between many NATO members
and the FRY (which, too, was a party to Protocol I), in formal legal terms the
United States was not so bound. This unevenness in the formal participation
in a key treaty could in principle have posed many problems in the conduct of
the Kosovo operations. In practice the fact that three NATO members were
not at that time parties to Protocol I does not appear to have been a problem.
This was mainly because the United States had long accepted that it would
observe a high proportion of the Protocol’s provisions, either because they
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40. Information as of July 1, 2002 from ICRC, UN and UNESCO websites, available at
www.icrc.org, www.un.org, and www.unesco.org, respectively.
41. France acceded to Protocol I on April 11, 2001.
represented customary law, or because it had been decided to apply them as a
matter of policy, especially in view of the reality of coalition warfare.42
Of the treaties to which the United States is not a party, probably the most
politically neuralgic is not the Protocol I (sensitive as that issue continues to
be) but the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The op-
position of the United States to this treaty, marking a reversal of its earlier
support for the general idea of such a court, reflects the fundamental Ameri-
can concern that US forces deployed in a wide range of situations globally
might face unfounded or politically motivated prosecutions, over which the
United States would have no control. The detailed terms of the Rome Statute
contain certain safeguards against such an eventuality.43 Because of these pro-
visions, I am tempted to say that the United States is suffering from a case of
“prosecution mania.” However, in Washington DC the fear of such prosecu-
tions was and is real. One of many US areas of concern is that in its conduct of
military operations the United States might decide to attack “dual-use” tar-
gets in a country, as it did in the Kosovo War, and then face an enthusiastic
prosecutor who might view this as an illegal attack on civilian objects.
Certain political and military hazards may flow from US non-participation
in the Rome Statute. The US voice on certain key issues may well be muffled.
In the future, US complaints about violations of the laws of war by its adver-
saries, and demands for the arrest of certain war criminals, may be weakened
by the US refusal to accept even the potential application of international ju-
dicial procedures under the ICC to any US forces. However, the most serious
consequence of US non-participation will be for the power of the court itself.
Without US participation, there are bound to be questions about whether the
ICC will have sufficient power to operate effectively.
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42. A succinct exposition of US policy on the application of Protocols I and II is in the US
Army’s Judge Advocate General’s School’s OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 2002, at ch. 2, pp.
4–5, and ch. 11, pp. 13–15 (Jeanne Meyer and Brian Bill eds., 2002), available at the Judge
Advocate General’s School’s website at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/
Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf.
43. Among the provisions of the Rome Statute offering safeguards: Article 8 on war crimes,
which requires that they be “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.” Certain safeguards in the case of “second track jurisdiction” (i.e.,
where the matter has not come to the ICC from the UN Security Council): Article 16, enabling
the Security Council to require the ICC to defer an investigation or prosecution; Article 17,
providing that a case is inadmissible where a State is genuinely carrying out investigation or
prosecution itself; and Article 18, enabling a State party to request the ICC to defer an investigation if
such State is pursuing the same matter, although such deferral is left to the ICC’s decision.
This pattern of US non-participation in existing treaties is, at least for this
observer, worrying. Other States which have a record of foreign military activ-
ity, including the United Kingdom, manage to be parties to many more of
these agreements, and have been less nervous about the possibility, remote as
it may be, of seeing the actions of their forces being actually or potentially sub-
mitted to the not always tender mercies of foreign prosecutors and courts.44
When a State such as the United States that on occasion acts as a principal
guarantor of implementation of humanitarian norms itself avoids being sub-
ject to many of those norms through the regular mechanism of treaty ratifica-
tion, it invites criticism.
Impact of legal norms in US-led combat operations
Whatever the US fears, the actual impact of international legal norms on
US conduct of operations has often been positive. Commitment to the laws of
war has contributed to the post-Vietnam rehabilitation of the US armed forces.
In both the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 war over Kosovo, the United States,
though not a party to Protocol I, observed many of its provisions—whether be-
cause of their customary law status, because it was policy to support them any-
way, or because of a need to harmonize targeting and other matters with allies.
The experience of these wars suggested that most of these provisions repre-
sented a useful set of guidelines for professional conduct.
Conclusions
After a war, there is a need to evaluate how well belligerents observe the
rules of war; and there is also a need to evaluate how appropriate or otherwise
the law is to the ever-changing circumstances and forms of armed conflict.
The NATO role in the 1999 Kosovo War was in some respects remarkably
successful, and did enable the overwhelming majority of people who had fled
from their homes to return. However, before too many lessons are drawn from
this success, it must be emphasized that it had many exceptional features, as
well as some that are more typical of the new types of conflict. There is proba-
bly a danger, as Mark Twain would have put it, of seeing more wisdom in it
than is there. A war in which one side had no casualties is exceptional, and
hardly likely to be repeated. Equally, it is hardly typical of modern conflict for
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44. The United Kingdom completed a key part of the Rome Statute ratification process on May
10, 2001, when the House of Commons passed the ICC Bill. Its ratification was registered with
the depositary on October 4, 2001.
Western armed forces to find themselves in combat against a disciplined
armed force under an organized State. With these caveats, the following con-
clusions are offered.
1. To a large extent NATO did succeed in the aim of avoiding damage to
civilians, and the events of the war largely confirm the value and viability of
the soldier/civilian distinction that is so central in the laws of war.
2. However, the war caused the death of about 495 civilians, had a huge im-
pact on civilians in both Kosovo and Serbia, and involved extensive destruc-
tion of “dual-use” targets. It is possible that the threat of further societal
destruction in Serbia played some part in the Serbian decision to capitulate: if
this is correct, then it follows that the requirement of victory, and the need to
observe the laws of war, could have been in considerable tension with each
other. NATO strategic doctrine, in so far as it concentrates on attacking the
adversary’s governmental structure, can involve problems in relation to the
laws of war. The question of what is a legitimate objective, addressed princi-
pally in Article 52 of 1977 Geneva Protocol I, remains a difficult one, and a
subject of contestation.
3. Reliance on air power as a means of implementing an action for funda-
mentally humanitarian purposes raised difficult moral questions. It also
proved to be something of a gamble, both because it could not protect the vic-
tims in the short term, and because many other factors were required to bring
about the Milosevic capitulation. The sense that the campaign had been a
close-run thing, and the product of a unique set of circumstances, contributed
to a feeling in many countries that it was unlikely to be repeated.
4. Implementation of the laws of war, and humanitarian norms more gener-
ally, had a particularly high profile not only in the course of this war, but also
in its beginnings and its ending. The importance of ensuring observance of in-
ternational humanitarian norms contributed to the factors leading up to the
initiation of the NATO military campaign. The indictment of Milosevic on
May 27, 1999 may have played some part in the Yugoslav leader’s decision to
accept the eventual settlement.
5. Whether this war will prove to have some deterrent function in respect
of potential future violations of fundamental humanitarian norms remains to
be seen. It did not stop Indonesian forces from engaging in mass killings in
East Timor in September 1999; though it may have given credibility to the ef-
forts subsequently made under UN auspices to stop the killings.
6. Among the many difficult laws of war issues raised by the war, perhaps
the most urgent is the explosive remnants of war, and in particular cluster
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bombs. On depleted uranium, more knowledge of its impact on health is
needed before that issue can be usefully addressed in the laws of war.
7. It remains an odd although not completely inexplicable paradox that the
United States, which has played the key part in developing a use of air warfare
that is reasonably consistent with key principles and provisions of the laws of
war, is outside so many parts of the treaty regime of the laws of war. This situa-
tion calls for careful analysis, not shrill condemnation. After the experience of
Kosovo, the US government could usefully re-examine the treaties to which it
is not party, to see if it can bring itself more into line with a treaty regime
which it has, in large measure, not merely observed but also found useful, not
least in the 1999 Kosovo War. Unfortunately there has been a tendency in the
United States to react negatively and defensively to the reasonably judicious
ICTY review of the NATO bombing campaign; and this tendency has rein-
forced the US government’s resistance to becoming a party to certain laws of
war treaties, including the ICC Statute.
8. The Kosovo War, and the role of the laws of war in it, evoked different
perceptions in different parts of the world. Some perceived the war favorably
as a case of NATO coming to the aid of an oppressed population which hap-
pened to be predominantly Muslim, and maintaining certain limits in its con-
duct of military operations. However others viewed these events much more
critically, as one further proof that the armed forces of northern countries, es-
pecially of course the United States, have established such a monopoly on the
battlefield that the only effective response to their presumed dominance be-
comes an asymmetric one, including terrorist attacks. In this view, to the ex-
tent that the laws of war are considered at all, they are deemed to suit the
north more than the south. Such a perception may be rooted in a naive and
probably incorrect view of the results that are presumed to flow from terrorist
attacks and other unlawful acts, but it appears to be held by many. Partly be-
cause of such perceptions, the effective US/NATO conduct of operations in
the Kosovo War, in a manner deeply influenced by laws of war considerations,
may paradoxically fail to discourage certain groups from conduct in which
such considerations are alien.
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